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Abstract: The collective sale of football broadcasting rights constitutes a cartel, 
which, in the European Union, is only allowed if it complies with a number of con-
ditions and obligations, inter alia, partial unbundling and the no-single-buyer rule. 
These regulations were defined with traditional TV-markets in mind. However, the 
landscape of audiovisual broadcasting is quickly changing with online streaming 
services gaining popularity and relevance. This also alters the effects of the condi-
tions and obligations for the centralized marketing arrangements. Partial unbun-
dling may lead to increasing instead of decreasing prices for consumers. Moreover, 
the combination of partial unbundling and the no-single-buyer rule forces consum-
ers into multiple subscriptions to several streaming services, which increases trans-
action costs. Consequently, competition authorities need to rethink the conditions 
and obligations they impose on centralized marketing arrangements in football. We 
recommend restricting the exclusivity of (live-)broadcasting rights and mandate 
third-party access to program guide information to redesign the remedies. 
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1. Introduction 
The ongoing process of digitization and the accompanying rise of online media 
challenge the traditional concepts and instruments of competition policy, fueling a 
discussion about necessary changes in antitrust rules and policies (inter alia, 
Budzinski & Stöhr, 2018, with further references). So far, markets for search ser-
vices, communication networks, online advertising, or e-commerce received most 
of the attention of competition authorities as well as of researchers, whereas com-
petition policy debates on sports markets still center around more traditional, “of-
fline” problems (see for a recent overview: Budzinski, 2019). However, the viewing 
behavior of “couch potato” sports fans is changing along with the rest of the 
population as well, more and more embracing new and social media (see section 
3). With respect to antitrust issues in sports markets, these changes in the con-
sumption behavior of sports fans particularly affect the marketing of sports broad-
casting rights. While popular with sports associations and participating teams, the 
economic view of centralized systems of the sale of broadcasting rights has always 
been rather critical with respect to consumer welfare effects (see section 2) – in Eu-
rope especially regarding European-style football1 broadcasting. European competi-
tion authorities – both on the EU-level and on the member state-level – have con-
sequently viewed such systems to constitute a cartel. However, the authorities also 
evaluated the consumer benefits of the institutional arrangements to outweigh its 
disadvantages – albeit only if a considerable number of obligatory remedies are 
respected by the football associations selling the broadcasting rights (see section 
2). These remedies include the obligation to partial unbundling as well as so-called 
no-single buyer rule, demanding the seller to create several packages (or bundles) 
of broadcasting rights instead of auctioning only one comprehensive bundle. In 
doing so, competition on the level of broadcasting services shall be protected at 
the benefit of the consumers (i.e. the sports fans).  
While the remedies appear to have been working well with football broadcasting 
consumers in the past, the shift of broadcasting from traditional free-television to-
wards paid-for online streaming services considerably changes the consumer wel-
                                                          
1  In this paper, the term football always denotes European-style football in contrast to, for in-
stance, American Football. 
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fare effects of the remedies, leading to negative reactions of football fans. This pa-
per analyses from a competition- and sports-economic perspective why and how 
the effects of the current remedies justifying the allowance of the cartel centralized 
marketing of football broadcasting rights in the EU are changing in the light of the 
new media world. Our analysis shows how competition policy instruments (here: 
remedies to a cartel) that used to serve consumer welfare in the traditional media 
world now turn to harming consumer welfare in the new media world. Conse-
quently, competition authorities need to rethink their conditional approval of joint 
selling arrangements of football broadcasting rights. We recommend focusing on 
restricting the exclusivity of (live-) broadcasting rights and demand third-party ac-
cess to program guide information in order to redesign the remedies to centralized 
marketing arrangements in football. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the economic discussion 
of centralized systems of selling broadcasting rights as well as the landmark Euro-
pean antitrust decisions in this regard. Section 3 reports selected developments in 
sports broadcasting and viewing behaviors, taking the example of Germany. Sub-
sequently, we discuss the changing welfare effects of the traditional remedies in 
the light of the new media world (section 4), before drawing antitrust implications 
(section 5).  
 
2. Centralized Marketing of Broadcasting Rights – A Controversial Issue 
When it comes to commercially marketing professional football games, two basic 
models exist: (i) every club sells the broadcasting rights of his home games individ-
ually (sharing the revenues with the away team) or (ii) all the participants of a 
league, a cup or any other championship bundle the broadcasting rights of all the 
respective games and sell them jointly, for instance, through an assigned compe-
tent association formed by the clubs. Alternatively, the collective sale of media 
rights may be managed by the sports association governing the championship in 
question. Currently, the European-level football leagues (UEFA Champions League 
and UEFA Europa League) as well as virtually all major professional national football 
leagues in Europe practice a collective sale of broadcasting rights. Until the season 
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2016/17, the premier-level football league of Spain, La Liga, represented a promi-
nent exemption as broadcasting rights were sold individually by the teams. 
A system of collective marketing of broadcasting rights is attractive for a league 
because it artificially creates a monopoly-like situation where the buyers, the 
broadcasting companies, face a single seller. In the case of premier-level football 
broadcasting rights, which enjoy a strong demand from football fans, the forced 
bundling results in supracompetitive media revenues (monopoly rent): while the 
media companies compete for the premium content, the teams of the league re-
place their interior competition for lucrative media deals by collective action (Cowie 
& Williams, 1997). Instead, they usually auction the bundled broadcasting rights as 
an exclusive package like a win-maximizing monopolist. From an economics-point 
of view, the cooperation among the league participants to collectively sell the 
broadcasting rights constitutes a market-wide cartel2, where the competitors (the 
clubs) collude to extract rents from the other market side by increasing prices and 
limiting output. The welfare effects of this type of joint selling cartels have been 
subject to controversial analysis in the sports economic literature (inter alia, Atkin-
son, Stanley, & Tschirhart, 1988; Késenne, 2000; 2009; 2014; Cave & Crandall, 
2001; Hoehn & Lancefield, 2003; Falconieri, Palomino, & Sákovics, 2004; Forrest, 
Simmons, & Szymanski, 2004; Palasca, 2006; Gürtler, 2007; Massey, 2007; Noll, 
2007; Peeters, 2011; 2012; Budzinski, 2019; Butler & Massey, 2019).  
On the one hand, it is expected to create considerable negative welfare effects. Due 
to the high importance of premier sports contents for broadcasting companies, 
their demand is relatively price-inelastic, leading to a dynamic bidding competition 
that drives up prices. Moreover, in order to further increase prices, the cartel expe-
riences incentives to reduce the number or extent of available media rights. Fur-
thermore, the cartel may hamper the development of certain innovative sub-
markets (e.g. new media markets or cross-border broadcasting), for instance, in 
order to protect rents from the exclusive sale to Pay-TV broadcasters. In doing so, it 
also causes negative dynamic welfare effects. Both increased prices and decreased 
                                                          
2  As long as the teams of the league form or (indirectly) control the governing body (i.e. the com-
petent sports association like the UEFA in the case of European football), the participation of this 
governing body does not change the nature of the cartel (Budzinski & Szymanski, 2015).  
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quantities as well as decelerated innovation harm consumers as they are (one way 
or the other) passed-through media levels. For instance, if media companies must 
pay supracompetitive prices for football broadcasting rights, both football-loving 
consumers and consumers with other preferences are harmed. In the case of paid 
content like Pay-TV or streaming services as well as in the case of tax-/fee-based 
content like Public-TV, there is a direct harm through higher subscriptions prices or 
fees. In the case of advertised-financed free content there is an indirect negative 
effect as users/viewers will have to endure more advertising. Alternatively (or addi-
tionally), the broadcasting companies may decide to invest less money into other 
sports and non-sports programs, which harms all consumers who prefer other or, 
at the least, more contents than football broadcasting. Beyond these pass-through 
effects, bundling broadcasting rights into one monopolistic package may facilitate 
market foreclosure in media markets, i.e. harming competition on this market stage 
(Weeds, 2016). Altogether, these anticompetitive effects are widely agreed upon in 
the literature referenced above. 
On the other hand, a collective sale of broadcasting rights may also come along 
with positive welfare effects. The most common one would be the competitive bal-
ance defense. It fundamentally relies on two assumptions: first, consumers value 
competitive balance, i.e. more competitive balance improves consumer welfare, 
and, second, centralized marketing leads to more competitive balance via a redis-
tribution mechanism in the course of the allocation of the common revenues 
among the league participants. The first line of reasoning originally represents one 
of the cores of sports economics thinking (Rottenberg, 1956; Neale, 1964). Howev-
er, empirical research always struggled to find convincing support (see for a com-
prehensive and recent literature review Pawlowski & Nalbantis, 2019) and newer 
theory also casts doubt on the idea that more competitive balance is what sports 
consumers (dominantly) want (inter alia, Szymanski, 2001; Coates, Humphreys, & 
Zhou, 2014; Humphreys & Zhou, 2015; Budzinski & Pawlowski, 2017; Pawlowski, 
Nalbantis, & Coates, 2018). The second reasoning sensitively depends on the design 
of the actual redistribution mechanisms that a football league chooses to imple-
ment. This can improve financial balance among the competing teams but this is 
not an automatism (inter alia, Budzinski 2018; Budzinski & Müller-Kock 2018). Al-
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together, the competitive balance defense used to be a popular reasoning in favor 
of centralized marketing but it has lost much of its appeal recently.  
Another positive welfare effect of a centralized marketing system may be that the 
cartel creates a single point of sale providing efficiencies by a reduction of transac-
tion costs for sellers and customers, i.e. media companies (Kienapfel & Stein, 2007, 
pp. 11–12). While this reasoning cannot qualify per se as a defense for a market-
wide cartel, it may become relevant given the specific nature of sports tournaments 
with knock-out character. In such cases, it may become difficult to sell the coverage 
of a whole championship in advance with a decentralized system, since nobody 
knows in advance who will survive the knock-out rounds and who will play against 
whom in later stages of the tournament. Thus, it would require selling the broad-
casting rights stepwise in sequences corresponding to the knock-out rounds 
(Budzinski, 2012, pp. 59–60). In contrast to many of the national football leagues, 
the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League at least partly consist of 
knock-out elements. Selling the coverage of a whole season in a one-stop shop-
ping, thus, requires a centralized sales system. Notwithstanding, the savings on 
transaction costs must be balanced with more efficient prices that are likely to re-
sult from stepwise auctions. 
Eventually, a related line of reasoning refers to potential efficiency effects from cre-
ating a common brand of the championship, which may lead to increasing recogni-
tion and, by establishing a coherent league product, may increase the attractive-
ness for the consumers. The focus may be directed towards the championship as a 
whole instead of on individual games between teams, creating an additional con-
sumption value for consumers (Kienapfel & Stein, 2007, pp. 11–12), including addi-
tional services like the broadcasting of comprehensive highlights programs of 
match-days (European Commission, 2003, rec. 146) or championship-related mer-
chandising. The crucial question here is whether a common brand and a common 
appearance could not be safeguarded without a collective sale of media rights as 
well, for instance, by a less-anticompetitive arrangement defining standards for the 
broadcasting (common design, etc.) that is sold individually. Furthermore, it ap-
pears to be doubtful whether a common brand and a common appearance justify 
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considerably higher prices from a consumer welfare perspective, i.e. whether con-
sumers really value brand and appearance that much. 
In their decisions on joint selling arrangements by the UEFA for European competi-
tions and by national league associations for national competitions, the European 
Commission (2003, 2005, 2006) has expressed its assessment that the advantages 
of collective sales systems of broadcasting rights outweigh the disadvantages from 
a consumer welfare perspective. However, in accordance with article 101 (3) TFEU, 
collective sales arrangements are only exempted from the cartel prohibition if they 
satisfy a number of conditions (European Commission, 2003, 2005, 2006), which 
include the following, somewhat simplified list of the main remedies: 
− Partial unbundling, i.e. limitation of the scope of exclusive vertical contracts: 
Centralized marketing must not consist of one comprehensive bundle sold in 
one auction to only one media company. Instead, the media rights must be 
unbundled into several separate packages in order to prevent market fore-
closure. In particular, exclusive football live broadcasting rights must be sep-
arated in at least two balanced and meaningful packages, so that it becomes 
possible that more than one broadcasting service buys rights bundles (and a 
broadcasting monopoly is not the inevitable outcome). The bundles should 
be sold to different broadcasters (European Commission 2003, rec. 22) 
− No single buyer obligation: In the case of already existing dominance of one 
broadcasting service in a given geographic market, the bundles must be sold 
to different broadcasting companies. 
− Competitive tendering: Tenders must be invited by a non-discriminatory and 
transparent competitive bidding process in order to give all potential buyers 
an opportunity to compete for each of the rights packages. 
− Sun-setting, i.e. limitation of the duration of exclusive vertical contracts: Ex-
clusive contracts must include a 'sun-setting mechanism', i.e. the duration of 
contracts is limited and automatically and comprehensively ends after the 
duration period without any possibility to get prolonged. Instead, a full-
blown new competitive tendering process must be set up after each period.  
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According to current Commission practice in football the duration must not 
exceed a period of three seasons. 
− Fall-back option, use obligation and parallel exploitation: In order to remedy 
output restrictions from the cartel arrangement, unused rights must fall back 
to the individual clubs for parallel, competitive exploitation. Moreover, in the 
case that a club’s home match is not included in a live or near-live package, 
the club must earn the right to individually sell the live-broadcasting right to 
its home match.  
− Trustee supervision of the tender procedure. 
These conditions have been shaped in the course of three major case decisions by 
the European Commission, covering centralized marketing arrangements by the 
UEFA Champions League, the English Premier League and the German Bundesliga. 
Already in the first landmark case, the UEFA Champions League case (European 
Commission, 2003) most of the conditions for clearance were implemented includ-
ing partial unbundling, competitive tendering, sun-setting, and the fall-back op-
tion. The second and third case, addressing centralized marketing of broadcasting 
rights of the German Bundesliga (European Commission, 2005) and the English 
Premier League (European Commission, 2006), revisited the conditions and obliga-
tions, specifying them (like the details of partial unbundling and competitive ten-
dering) and adding the no single buyer obligation as well as the trustee supervi-
sion. In the Premier League-case, the European Commission (2006) considered the 
pay TV media channel British Sky Broadcasting3 to possess a dominant market posi-
tion. Thus, Sky would have had the option to applying foreclosure strategies, if it 
had obtained comprehensive exclusive rights, i.e. if it had bought all the tendered 
bundles for live broadcasting. Therefore, the obligation of partial unbundling was 
extended by a further condition: no single buyer was allowed to purchase all of the 
major bundles.4 In the Bundesliga case, the Commission for the first time empha-
sized the participation of online-media channels in the auction (Evens, Iosifides, & 
Smith, 2014), demanding earmarked packages for different media in order to pro-
                                                          
3  Now Sky Ltd. 
4  See Butler and Massey (2019) for an excellent ex post analysis of the effects of the Premier 
League case. 
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tect and safeguard the possibility of dynamic competition for innovative media 
among broadcasters. 
The decisions of the European Commission are (imperfectly) reflected in national 
antitrust decisions within the EU due to the close cooperation of national competi-
tion agencies with the European Commission within the European Competition 
Network (Budzinski & Christiansen, 2005). For instance, the Bundeskartellamt (Fed-
eral Cartel Office of Germany) applied similar remedies to granting the centralized 
marketing of the national broadcasting rights of Germany’s professional football 
leagues (Bundeskartellamt, 2008; 2012), including a no single buyer obligation, 
particularly with a view to the competition among traditional live broadcasting and 
online streaming (Bundeskartellamt, 2016; Monopolkommission, 2018).  
In 2017, the main broadcasting rights (i.e. the rights to live-broadcasting) of the 
UEFA competitions (UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League, and UEFA Su-
per Cup) were auctioned centralized by the UEFA in a three-year bundle (seasons 
2018/2019 – 2020/21). In compliance with the Commission’s obligations, the UEFA 
offered a variety of platform-neutral rights packages to buyers. Sky Sport (as a sub-
sidiary of Sky Germany GmbH and, therefore, Sky Ltd.) acquired virtually all the 
rights to live-broadcast the UEFA Champions League in Germany. It broadcasts the 
games via its subscription-based Pay-TV service (that additionally includes the 
online streaming services Sky Go and Sky On Demand) as well as through its sub-
scription-based online streaming service Sky Ticket. Presumably, in order to comply 
with the no single buyer desideratum, Sky sub-licensed some of these rights to 
DAZN. The latter, a subscription-based online service operated by Perform Group 
Ltd., acquired the majority of the live broadcasting rights of the UEFA Europa 
League. Furthermore, the live-broadcasting rights to selected games, albeit with 
considerable limitations (non-exclusive content, second choice), were sold to RTL 
Television for traditional advertising-financed free TV broadcasting. Germany is a 
quite representative example for an ongoing shift towards Pay-TV and paid-for 
online-only streaming services (inter alia, Sky Sport in Austria, Italy, and New Zea-
land, DAZN in Canada, Sky Pacific for the Pacific Islands, and O2 TV in Czech Repub-
lic). Furthermore, this trend is also observable on the national level; for instance, 
the live-broadcasting rights to the German Bundesliga went to the subscription-
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based offers of Sky and Eurosport and DAZN owns further exclusive live-
broadcasting rights to games of the French Ligue 1, Italy’s Serie A and Spain’s La 
Liga. 
 
3. The Changing Landscape of Broadcasting Markets 
For many decades, two models of television (TV) dominated the market and, con-
sequently, the discussion on broadcasting of sports: Free-TV versus Pay-TV. Free-TV 
concepts entail public service broadcasters, financed by taxpayer money, as well as 
commercial broadcasters financed by advertising revenues, whereas Pay-TV is usual-
ly subscription-based, either with a flatrate price or with a pay-per-view arrange-
ment. However, the landscape of broadcasting markets is dynamically changing, on 
both the demand and the supply side. 
The overall demand for online video content is increasing due to widespread access 
to broadband connections and the emergence of digital services. New technologies 
and the compatibility with mobile devices simplify usage and decrease the cost of 
online consumption. Although classic TV programs are still popular5, there is a 
steady shift from TV to online streaming and new media (Budzinski & Lindstädt-
Dreusicke, 2019; Budzinski, Lindstädt-Dreusicke, & Gaenssle, 2019). Especially 
younger generations prefer flexible ways of consumption, independent of time and 
place. On the one hand, non-linear (i.e. without strict programming schedule) vid-
eo-on-demand (VoD) platforms allow time-independent access to content (like 
movies, serials, entertainment videos, etc.), on the other hand, online live stream-
ing offers access to time-bound contents (like live-broadcasting) from various plac-
es using various devices (mobile smartphones and tablets, smart TVs, etc.). The dai-
ly usage of online videos in Germany, for instance, increased from 3 percent in 
2007 to over 20 percent in 2016 and 2017 (Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke, 2019: 
10). 
The shift from traditional TV to online streaming and new media can also be ob-
served regarding sports consumption. There is an increasing demand of sports and 
e-sports content on platforms like YouTube and Twitch. This includes especially 
                                                          
5  According to the study by Frees and Koch (2018, p. 401) the daily average reach of TV is still 71.6 
percent in Germany. 
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novel disciplines, focusing on young (and often technophile) audiences, who gen-
erate their own championship pages or stream video content on social media pag-
es, like e.g. HLTV (Counter-Strike) or CrossFit.6 Notwithstanding, this development 
can also be observed for more traditional sports (like football). As a recent study 
reports, sports contents do not only drive TV consumption but also consumption of 
online streaming services (Budzinski, Lindstädt-Dreusicke, & Gaenssle, 2019). All 
age groups, but especially young sports fans, use online options (see figure 1). This 
indicates that the overall trend will intensify over time. 
 
Figure 1 Sports Consumption – Streaming vs. TV [percent] 
 
Source: Budzinski, Lindstädt-Dreusicke, & Gaenssle (2019)7 
 
The market of online streaming services is heterogeneous and dynamic, character-
ized by intensive competition and considerable new entry dynamics during the last 
decade (Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke, 2019). It currently consists of considerably 
different business models, including for instance (usually subscription-based) paid-
for streaming (inter alia, Sky and Netflix), advertising-financed streaming without 
charging the consumers (inter alia, YouTube and Twitch) as well as online libraries 
from public service broadcasters and other traditional TV channels. In many coun-
tries, including most EU member states, comparatively young online-only competi-
tors like Netflix and Amazon (with its Prime service) are the current market leaders 
                                                          
6  See: https://www.hltv.org/ for Counter Strike or https://games.crossfit.com/sanctionals for Cross-
Fit. 
7  Questioned: 2,931 in Germany, average age: 31.56 years. 
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in online streaming. However, incumbent media players, who were well-positioned 
in the offline media markets, try to recover lost ground by setting up their own 
streaming services, e.g. Disney+, Sky Ticket, or Joyn, and/or forming powerful alli-
ances, e.g. the recent Disney-Fox and AT&T-Time Warner mega-mergers (Stöhr et 
al., 2019). In this dynamic competition, premium sports contents represent an im-
portant tool to attract viewers and generate subscriptions. Thus, various platforms 
offer sports contents such as live broadcasting/streams, reporting and media cover-
age or documentaries. Figure 2 exemplarily shows the usage of online streaming 
services sorted by service suppliers in Germany in 2018. At the time of the survey, 
34.5 percent of respondents said they were using online video platforms. Notably, 
with its specialization on sports contents, newcomer DAZN (since 2016) already 
reached 2.8 percent. However, due to the economic characteristics of the market 
for online streaming services (like platform effects and data-driven business mod-
els; Budzinski & Stöhr, 2018; Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke, 2019), it must be 
expected that, in the longer run, only few services will accumulated considerable 
market shares and many of the current and upcoming services will leave the mar-
ket. 
 
Figure 1 VoD-Platforms and Usage 2018 in Germany [percent] 
 
Source: Die Medienanstalten (2018, p. 49).8 
 
                                                          
8  Base: 70,094 million people over the age of 14 in Germany; Questioned: 29,379 million people 
 over the age of 14 in Germany, online streaming usage more than once a month. 
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Already now, a large share of UEFA content is only available through subscription-
based online streaming services and this development is set to continue and further 
escalate. However, watching football broadcasting online significantly differs from 
watching on traditional TV: instead of just switching between TV channels on the 
remote control, fans need to subscribe to different services, which may run on dif-
ferent player systems and require different access technologies. Thus, develop-
ments previously observable in markets with dominance of Pay-TV over Free-TV (like 
in the case of the English Premier League; Butler & Massey 2019) are further aggra-
vated and extended by the shift towards online broadcasting. This raises the ques-
tion whether consumer welfare is still safeguarded by the ‘old’ remedies, i.e. condi-
tions and obligations made with traditional TV in mind. 
 
4. Welfare Effects in New Media Markets 
As argued in section 2, centralized marketing comes with negative welfare effects 
for consumers and the conditions and obligations are meant to remedy these ef-
fects. It may already be controversial whether they have achieved this goal in the 
offline media world and, furthermore, some of the obligations are likely to be dis-
playing increasing negative consumer welfare in online media markets. Crucially, 
the core conditions and obligations seeking to safeguard competition and consum-
er welfare, the partial unbundling as well as the no single buyer obligation, appear 
to be particularly problematic here.  
The underlying idea of partial unbundling and no single buyer is to avoid a mo-
nopoly football broadcaster9 and promote competition among football broadcast-
ers – thus, to lower prices for consumers. While this may work for competition 
amongst Free-TV and for competition among Free- and Pay-TV alternatives, the 
price-decreasing effect is empirically not supported for Pay-TV competition in Eng-
land. Instead, the overall price as well as the price per game is higher with compet-
ing broadcasters than under a monopoly (Butler & Massey, 2019). Reasons may 
include incentives to overbidding: a viable market position in the downstream 
                                                          
9  From an antitrust economics point of view, this term may be imprecise since it is not completely 
clear (despite their premium content character for media) whether football live-broadcasts repre-
sent a single relevant market. 
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broadcasting market can only obtained with premium content and football live-
broadcasting rights belong to the scarce quantity of such rights, therefore, broad-
casters enjoy incentives to overbid to secure a specific portfolio (Hoehn & Lance-
field, 2003). Another reason may be that the different bundles offered by UEFA are 
not substitutes but rather complements for football fans. Consequently, each me-
dia company that has secured live-broadcasting rights may experience incentives to 
treat consumers as a monopolist because it offers part of something that consum-
ers want as a whole. These incentives will be particularly strong if only few media 
companies bought live-broadcasting rights. Alternatively, another reason may be 
market division if consumers segment themselves (for instance, into casual and 
hardcore fans) and the bundles offered in the auctions resemble this segmentation 
(e.g. two bundles: a basic package and an extended package). As a consequence, 
each broadcaster may be able to treat ‘his’ consumer segment as if he was a mo-
nopolist (Butler & Massey, 2019). Negative impacts on consumer welfare may even 
increase, if the strong duopolists decide to strategically split contents, forcing con-
sumers to subscribe to both services. Again, this effect rests on a narrow market 
structure. 
These incentives for duopolists to strategically raise prices are even stronger for 
online streaming services than for Pay-TV. Online streaming services compete for 
subscribers in a very dynamic market with a considerable number of competitors 
that is prone to significantly narrow down in the future (see section 3). Therefore, 
premium content is of paramount importance to gain subscribers and grow as a 
streaming service – and, eventually, to belong to the survivors in the market. Fur-
thermore, lock-in effects of consumers to streaming services are likely to be at the 
least as relevant as with Pay-TV. Thus, the scope for the strategic setting of su-
pracompetitive prices may be considerable in the new media world. 
However, even if no strategic considerations played a role, it would still be ques-
tionable whether two competing subscription-based broadcasting services would 
provide a lower-price offer to consumers than one monopoly broadcaster. If the 
number of live-broadcasts is constant (use obligation), the price of two subscrip-
tions to competing streaming services will likely exceed the subscription price of a 
monopoly supplier simply due to the individual cost structure. If that is the case, 
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then the remedies partial unbundling and no single buyer, leading to a narrow oli-
gopoly offering live-broadcasting of football, ceteris paribus (further) decrease con-
sumer welfare in the sense that they lead to a accumulated price to consume the 
same amount of UEFA football.  
The obligations to partially unbundle live-broadcasting rights and to sell them to at 
least two different broadcasters cause an additional effect for consumers: it elimi-
nates a one-stop-shopping option. One-stop-shopping implies the option for foot-
ball fans to consume all live-broadcasting from one source, i.e. one single broad-
casting or streaming service. One-stop shopping is attractive to consumers if the 
(transaction) costs of using more than one supplier are significant. Again, this is an 
issue that is rather unproblematic if broadcasting rights are split among Free-TV 
channels: one press on the remote control switches the consumer to the desired 
channel and information about all channels is easily available by the TV program 
guide (be it a printed magazine in former times or digital). Already if Pay-TV comes 
into play, transaction costs for the consumers increase since subscription and pay-
ment arrangements must be made with the different broadcasters. This is especially 
true if the rights bundles are allocated among different Pay-TV broadcasters only. 
An allocation to paid-for, subscription-based online streaming services further in-
creases transaction costs for consumers as they need to handle multiple subscrip-
tions (contracts, payments, passwords, etc.), which may require different players 
and software packages and, thus, to learn how to use the different systems. Fur-
thermore, a common program guide is missing. In a survey conducted among 102 
users of online football streaming services in Germany, 80.6 per cent are annoyed 
by increasing information costs to find out which game is broadcasted when by 
what streaming service.10 The survey is non-representative with a bias towards 
younger and higher educated consumers, which implies that representative num-
bers may even be higher. 
That online services increase search and information costs appears to be surprising 
at first sight since online streaming services contain the possibility of data-based 
individualized search and recommendation services. These are usually hailed as an 
                                                          
10  Weber (2019, p. 83). Furthermore, 68.5 per cent find the sublicensing of Sky rights to DAZN 
“confusing”. 
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important success factor of online services (inter alia, Budzinski & Stöhr, 2018). 
However with the segmentation of broadcasting rights demanded by the obliga-
tions of partial unbundling and no single buyer, the positive consumer welfare ef-
fects of these are limited because, generally speaking, there is no cross-platform/-
service information. On each streaming platform, consumers cannot search for of-
ferings of other (competitive) suppliers and do not receive recommendations to 
streams of competing services. Thus, the fragmentation of the broadcasting rights 
also considerably limits possible consumer advantages of such individualized search 
and recommendation services. 
Altogether, the partial unbundling and the no single buyer obligation harm con-
sumers of online media in two ways: they increase prices and transaction costs. 
With respect to the other remedies, Butler and Massey (2019) conclude that, at 
present, the fall back option has very minor relevance because nearly all games are 
included in live or near-live packages – and the movement towards online stream-
ing services is likely to continue this trend. Furthermore, competitive tendering, 
sun-setting, and trustee supervision all appear to be and remain supportive to con-
sumer welfare. 
 
5. Antitrust Implications 
The discussion in the preceding section has revealed that parts of the antitrust 
remedies imposed by the European Commission, namely partial unbundling and no 
single buyer rule, harm consumers by increasing prices and transaction costs. Not-
withstanding this result, it would be wrong, though, to conclude that ‘just’ giving 
up these obligations would be the logical consequence. It needs to be remembered 
that these obligations are mandated by competition authorities in order to remedy 
negative consumer welfare effects from the collective sale of broadcasting rights, in 
particular from the monopoly pricing of the football league/association, passed-
through to consumers in various ways (see section 2). If the introduction of artifi-
cial competition elements into centralized marketing through the obligations of 
partial unbundling and no single buyer does effectively not remedy negative con-
sumer welfare effects in the online age anymore, but instead aggravates them, 
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then the justification for exempting the broadcasting rights cartel from the cartel 
prohibition becomes obsolete.  
An individual sale of broadcasting rights by the participating clubs would effective-
ly prevent the anticompetitive effects created by centralized marketing and alt-
hough it would likely also cause the burden of multiple subscriptions for consum-
ers, it would certainly drive prices down. This points to an inherent trade-off: more 
and smaller bundles are likely to reduce subscription prices, however, at the same 
time, they are increasing the transaction costs for multiple subscriptions. This trade-
off may be viewed as a reason to think about more adequate remedies for a collec-
tive sale system of broadcasting rights instead of calling for its abandonment. It 
also emphasizes, however, that increasing the number of bundles in a collective 
sale system by means of obligations may partly alleviate one problem (high prices) 
but aggravate the other one (high transaction costs due to multiple subscriptions). 
Along similar lines, Butler and Massey (2019) suggest with a view to the Pay-TV 
market in England to establish a maximum of 50 per cent (or even lower thresh-
olds) of broadcasting rights/bundles that one single buyer may acquire. Again, 
while this may fuel competition on the media market, it also boosts multiple sub-
scriptions.  
Next to detailing the number of bundles and the amount that a single buyer may 
acquire, the content of the bundles may be regulated, e.g. by mandating club-
specific bundles. While club fans desire to watch all games of their favorite club, 
competition fans love to follow the overall tournament (Szymanski, 2001; Peeters, 
2012). For club fans, club-specific bundles would indeed solve the trade-off, 
whereas, however, competition fans still would face multiple subscriptions. Moreo-
ver, this idea attempts to closely mirror individual marketing by the clubs, so it 
would be preferable to ban centralized marketing altogether. Another avenue 
would target to regulate the type of the buyer, like, for instance, a condition to sell 
a minimum number of rights bundles to Free-TV or to free streaming services (ad-
vertising-financed and/or data-based) and/or to oblige paid-for services to grant a 
minimum number of non-exclusive rights to free services.  
However, an effective remedy to the anticompetitive effects of a collective sale of 
football broadcasting rights requires addressing one of the causes for (i) high prices 
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on the upstream level (the rights auction), (ii) additional mark-ups on the down-
stream level (subscription prices), and (iii) consumers facing multiple subscriptions 
issues. If competition authorities like the European Commission prohibited or lim-
ited the exclusivity of live-streaming rights, then all three issues would be alleviated 
(for (i) and (ii) also: Butler & Massey, 2019). No (or less) exclusivity anymore would 
definitely drive down prices on both levels: the willingness-to-pay from media 
companies including paid-for online streaming services would decrease as would 
their ability to lock-in or segment consumers. Broadcasting/streaming rights would 
gain the character of substitutes (instead of being complements), which would in-
tensify competition for viewers (fans). Furthermore, one-stop shopping offers may 
become available for consumers without the downside of monopoly prices and 
lock-in effects. Add to this that exclusivity virtually does nothing for consumer wel-
fare, so that a loss of exclusivity would not negatively affect consumers. Also, the 
efficiency defenses stipulated by the European Commission – the single point of 
sale and the common brand and appearance – would not be harmed as well. 
A variant of restricting exclusivity refers to geographic territory exclusivity, i.e. the 
sale of rights exclusive for (and restricted to) broadcasting in one specific country. 
The current conditions and obligations for exempting collective sale systems of 
broadcasting rights in the EU allow for this type of exclusivity and prohibit any 
commercial circumvention like showing a Greek broadcasting of English premier-
league football in a pub in the United Kingdom (the so-called Murphy-case; Butler 
& Massey, 2019). However, streaming markets are considerably less bound to na-
tional borders than traditional TV markets. Therefore, allowing consumers (by 
means of conditions and obligations) to freely choose between different countries’ 
streams (distinguishing themselves by commentator’s language and focus of the 
broadcast on their local heroes) may already contribute considerably to consumer 
welfare. Banning restrictions on geographic territory altogether represents another 
option.   
Eventually, effective restrictions to the exclusivity of the bundles’ content could be 
combined with an obligation to create a common program guide or to grant access 
to the relevant information for third-parties offering such a service. Irrespective of 
the availability of a one-stop-shopping option, such a condition for approval would 
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considerably reduce the burden of multiple subscriptions. Alternatively, streaming 
services could be mandated to display cross-service search and recommendation 
results. However, such an obligation would probably be difficult to police and rep-
resents a comparatively strong intervention into the respective business models of 
the streaming services. 
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